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Abstract. This paper analyzes equilibrium social distancing behavior in a
model where pharmaceutical innovations, such as effective vaccines and treatments,
are anticipated to arrive in the future. Once such an innovation arrives, costly
social distancing can be greatly reduced. We characterize how the anticipation
of such innovations influences the pre-innovation path of social distancing. We
show that when vaccines are anticipated, equilibrium social distancing is ramped
up as the arrival date approaches to increase the probability of reaching the post-
innovation phase in the susceptible state. In contrast, under anticipated treatment,
equilibrium social distancing is completely phased out by the time of arrival. We
compare the equilibrium paths with the socially optimal counterparts and discuss
policy implications.
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“Our strategy is to suppress the virus, protecting the economy, education and the NHS,
until a vaccine can make us safe”.
- Matt Hancock, UK Health Secretary, October 1, 2020.1
“Vaccines and therapeutic drugs might be available in a year or so’s time. But it is a
foolish strategy to rely on them, and to keep us in lockdown — or other severe social-
distancing measures —until such a time”.
- Ross Clark, The Spectator, April 2020.2
∗School of Economics, University of Kent. Email: m.makris@kent.ac.uk.
†Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. Email: fmot2@cam.ac.uk.
1https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extended-measures-to-protect-more-areas-of-england-
from-coronavirus
2Britain Can’t Rely on a Vaccine to Ease Lockdown Restrictions, The Spectator,
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/britain-can-t-rely-on-a-vaccine-to-ease-lockdown-restrictions
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1. Introduction
In the absence of effective vaccines and antiviral treatments, individuals and public health
authorities have been entirely reliant on non-pharmaceutical interventions such as social
distancing and lockdowns. These interventions, while often justified, have proven ex-
tremely costly from both a social and an economic perspective and there is a general
recognition that such restrictive measures as shelter-in-place orders are not sustainable
in the long run. Equally, it is widely recognized that until effective pharmaceutical in-
terventions become available, a return to normality is unlikely to be possible. In short,
containing the epidemic will involve social distancing to some extent till vaccines and
treatments become available. But an important question remains. Once the pharmaceu-
tical innovations appear on the horizon, how will and should people behave leading up to
that moment? In other words, how exactly is social distancing phased out? This is the
question we consider in the present analysis.
In this paper, we study positive and normative questions of infection control via non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), when pharmaceutical innovations are anticipated.
In particular, we are interested in better understanding how the anticipation of effective
vaccines and treatments changes ex-ante incentives to engage in social distancing and how
such effects differ across innovations. To this end, we study a stylized susceptible-infected-
recovered (SIR) model of infection control in which decision makers can reduce infection
risk at a cost. At some known future time T , a perfectly functioning pharmaceutical
innovation such as a vaccine or a treatment becomes available, obviating any further
social distancing. A perfect treatment means that any infected individual who is treated
immediately recovers, while a perfect vaccine means that anyone who is vaccinated obtains
perfect and lasting immunity. In this setting, we characterize the equilibrium and socially
optimal paths of social distancing. We show that these paths depend on whether the
innovation is a treatment or a vaccine. The reason for this is that while treatment can
be given to any infected individual regardless of when the individual was infected (in
particular, irrespective of whether the individual was infected before or after the arrival
of the treatment), only susceptible individuals can benefit from the arrival of the vaccine.
The effect of this is that for treatment, the value of social distancing decreases as the
arrival date approaches. In fact, on the date of arrival, no social distancing takes place
at all. In contrast, before the arrival of the vaccine, social distancing by individuals is
ramped up just before arrival, to increase the chances that they can benefit from the
vaccine.
To illustrate these points, we consider three scenarios. In the benchmark, no pharma-
ceutical innovation ever arrives and so the decision makers must resort to social distancing
throughout the epidemic. In addition, we consider the case where the innovation arrives
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before peak prevalence is reached in the benchmark scenario and the case where it arrives
after. These three cases allow us to not only determine how the arrival of the innovation
influences pre-innovation social distancing efforts, but also how this dependence changes
across the stages of the epidemic.
It should be noted that strictly speaking, the key date for the purpose of decision
making is the date of availability, rather than the date of innovation. Thus our analysis
equally applies to situations where the pharmaceutical innovations have already been
made but where decision makers are awaiting delivery of the vaccine or treatment, as the
case may be.
The paper contributes to the larger literature on economic epidemiology, in particular
to the literatures on social distancing and on the interaction of several instruments of
disease control. Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2020) analyze the interaction of equilibrium
and socially optimal social distancing and treatment in a model of recurrent infection
(SIS) when both are present, while Toxvaerd and Rowthorn (2020) consider equilibrium
and socially optimal use of treatment and vaccination in isolation in an SIR environment.
Toxvaerd (2019) considers the welfare effects of policies such as pre-exposure prophylaxis
in an SIS model of social distancing. Giannitsarou, Kissler and Toxvaerd (2020) study
a model of socially optimal social distancing in an SEIRS model with vital dynamics.
In their model, the social planner values lives beyond the active planning horizon, after
which the disease is no longer a concern. They show that the social planner may have
an incentive to increase the number of survivors at the end of the planning horizon, thus
prompting an increase in social distancing as the end date approaches. Some of our results
have a similar character, although they differ in the details and in their interpretation.
Toxvaerd (2020) and Makris (2020) consider equilibrium social distancing in settings
where no pharmaceutical interventions are forthcoming and are therefore comparable to
our benchmark scenario.
In a macroeconomic model of disease propagation, Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Tra-
bandt (2020) consider the possibility of a vaccine or a treatment that arrives with a
constant probability in each period. As in our paper, they characterize how the possible
arrival of these pharmaceutical innovations interact with other decisions, in their case
over consumption and labour supply. In contrast to our results, they show that in the
competitive equilibrium, the possibility of such innovations makes very little difference
in their framework. A central difference between our setup and theirs is that the arrival
process has a constant hazard rate (i.e. the arrival probability is constant over time),
whereas in our model, individuals know that arrival is approaching as time passes. This
introduces an additional source of non-stationarity to our model over and above that in
the underlying epidemiological dynamics. Last, Bognanni et al. (2020) consider a spatial
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macroeconomic-epidemiological model of social distancing in which a vaccine may arrive.
In contrast to our analysis, theirs do no feature forward-looking behavior and thus their
results are not directly comparable to ours.
2. Decentralized Decision Making
Consider a susceptible-infected-recovered compartmental model of an infectious disease.
Time is continuos and at some instant t, an individual is either susceptible and belongs
to the compartment S(t), infected and infectious and belongs to the compartment I(t)
or recovered and immune, thus belonging to the compartment R(t). We will denote
the measures of these compartments by S(t), I(t) and R(t) respectively. In this model,
infection spreads though meetings between susceptible and infected individuals at a rate
that depends on underlying biology and social distancing behavior. In particular, we
assume that behaviour reduces the infectiousness parameter β to some level β(1−d(t)) <
β, where d(t) ∈ [0, 1] is a measure for social distancing. Once infected, individuals recover
spontaneously at some exogenous rate γ > 03. The dynamics are given by
Ṡ(t) = −β(1− d(t))I(t)S(t) (1)
İ(t) = I(t) [β(1− d(t))S(t)− γ] (2)
Ṙ(t) = γI(t) (3)
1 = S(t) + I(t) +R(t) (4)
S(0) ≈ 1, S(0) + I(0) = 1, S(0) > γ/β (5)
Assume that the individuals earn some flow payoff π > 0 while susceptible but expe-
rience a decrease in flow payoffs to some level π < π while infected. Once they recover,
they return to earning flow payoff π. Individuals discount the future at rate ρ > 0.
Let pi(t) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability at instant t ≥ 0 of residence in health state
i = S, I,R for the individual. At time T > 0, a pharmaceutical intervention becomes
available (either treatment or vaccine). For all times t < T , the individual can only
mitigate infection risk by choosing social distancing d(t) ∈ [0, 1] at cost c(d(t)) with
c′ > 0 and c′′ ≥ 0. For simplicity, we can take c(d) = d2/2 where c′(d) = d and c′′(d) = 1.
The problem to be solved by a susceptible individual is given by
3The model is readily extended to include the possibility of disease-induced mortality. One simple
way to include this possibility is to replace γ with γ/(1− σ), where σ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the
individual will die of the disease before recovering. This formalisation of mortality is discussed further
in Keeling and Rohani (2008).





e−ρt {pS(t)[π − c(d(t))] + pI(t)π + pR(t)π} dt+e−ρT [pS(T )VS+pI(T )VI+pR(T )VR]
(6)
In this objective function, Vi is the expected net present value of entering the post-
innovation phase inhabiting health state i = S, I,R. These values depend on the nature
of the pharmaceutical innovation and will be further characterized below.
The individual’s problem is solved subject to the following system of differential equa-
tions:
ṗS(t) = −(1− d(t))βI(t)pS(t), pS(0) = 1 (7)
ṗI(t) = (1− d(t))βI(t)pS(t)− γpI(t) (8)
ṗR(t) = γpI(t) (9)
It is worth emphasizing that under decentralized decision making, each individual takes
the aggregate dynamics as given and chooses a path of social distancing in order to
maximize his or her individual expected discounted utility. The outcome is thus one
of perfect foresight equilibrium, in which the aggregate dynamics that the individuals
anticipate when choosing their social distancing policies actually materializes.
Let λDi (t) denote the costate variables for the state variables pi(t), i = S, I,R. Then
the individual’s current-value Hamiltonian is given by
HD = pS(t)[π − c(d(t))] + pI(t)π + pR(t)π (10)
−λDS (t)(1− d(t))βI(t)pS(t) (11)
+λDI (t)[(1− d(t))βI(t)pS(t)− γpI(t)] (12)
+λDR(t)γpI(t) (13)
A necessary condition for individual maximization is that
∂HD
∂d(t)
= −pS(t)c′(d(t)) + βI(t)pS(t)[λDS (t)− λDI (t)] = 0 (14)
which can be re-written as
c′(d(t)) = βI(t)[λDS (t)− λDI (t)] (15)
This equation just means that for the individual to be best responding, the marginal cost
of social distancing must equal the marginal benefit, measured by the avoided expected
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utility cost from becoming infected. With quadratic costs, we get that
d(t) = βI(t)[λDS (t)− λDI (t)] (16)
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium path of social distancing, we need
to determine the evolution of the three costate variables and impose the appropriate
transversality conditions. The laws of motion for the costate variables are:
λ̇
D





















= ρλDR(t)− π (19)
Last, the transversality conditions are
λDS (T )e
−ρT = VS (20)
λDI (T )e
−ρT = VI (21)
λDR(T )e
−ρT = VR (22)
The transversality conditions will play a prominent role in this analysis and so it is useful
to recall their interpretation.4 In general, the costate variable λDi (t) captures the value
of being in state i = S, I,R. The transversality conditions simply express the present
value of residence in the different health states on the date of innovation as being equal to
the post-innovation continuation value, which depends on the health state in which the
individual enters this phase (and is further analyzed in what follows) and on the nature
of the pharmaceutical intervention.
The salvage values on the right-hand sides of the transversality conditions (20), (21)
and (22), are value functions that depend on the post-innovation regime, and on whether
the innovation is a treatment or a vaccine. With costly or imperfect innovations, e.g. with
a partially protective vaccine or a treatment that only induces recovery with a delay, there
will generally be a role for social distancing even after the arrival of the pharmaceutical
innovation. While this is conceptually a straightforward extension of our analysis, we
focus on the simpler case in which the innovations are costless and perfect. This means
4This is a fixed-end-time problem with a salvage value. The transversality conditions for this case are
given in Caputo (2005, Theorem 10.3, p. 277).
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that post-innovation, there is no role for social distancing. This simplification allows us to
focus on the characterization of social distancing and how it is affected by the anticipation
of the innovation. In a later section, we outline how our main conclusions are modified
when imperfections in vaccines and treatment are taken into account.
After substituting the explicit policy (16) into (1)-(3) and (17)-(19), we have re-
duced the problem to analyzing the behavior of the system of differential equations for




R(t)) with appropriate terminal conditions for the costate
variables and appropriate initial conditions for the epidemic variables.
Before embarking on the detailed analysis of equilibrium social distancing when phar-
maceutical innovations are anticipated, we will briefly discuss the benchmark in which
individuals only rely on non-pharmaceutical interventions throughout. In this setting,
each individual’s behavior is dictated by two considerations, namely current prevalence
and the future path of the epidemic. First, because an individual’s present probability
of becoming infected is proportional to disease prevalence, as this changes so does the
incentive to self-protect, all else equal. Second, the value of remaining healthy, which
justifies engaging in costly social distancing, changes across the stages of the epidemic.
From the perspective of an individual, who treats the path of the epidemic as exogenously
given, infection risk is hump-shaped. This means that there will typically be two dates
at which a given prevalence level is reached; at the first, prevalence is increasing while
at the second, it is decreasing. But the individuals will value protection more on the
second date than on the first. This is because on the first date, future infection hazards
are much greater than on the second date and thus the value of getting safely through
the next small time interval is higher later in the epidemic.
The upshot of this is that while the incentive of individuals to self-protect qualitatively
follows disease prevalence, they also intensify over time, ceteris paribus.
2.1. The Case of a Perfect Treatment. Assume that the treatment is costless and
works instantaneously. This means that once the treatment becomes available, there is
no need for costly social distancing. This is because any individual that becomes infected
can immediately recover at no cost and thereby essentially neglect the risk of infection.
Consequently, the value functions in the post-treatment phase are




In other words, the health state of an individual going into the post-treatment phase
is completely immaterial for the individual’s wellbeing. A susceptible or recovered indi-
vidual will earn flow payoff π (recalling that the former will expend no effort on social
distancing), while an infected individual can ensure this same flow payoff instantaneously
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Prevalence and Social Distancing When Anticipating Treatment.
through treatment at no cost.
The equilibrium dynamics in this scenario are illustrated in Figure 1, where the upper
panel shows disease prevalence while the lower panel shows social distancing. We consider
three cases, namely arrival of a treatment in period 60, 80 and 120, respectively. The
black line shows the benchmark case in which the innovation arrives when the disease has
practically died out, namely T = 120. In this case, treatment plays essentially no role
for aggregate dynamics. In contrast, the blue line shows a case in which the treatment
arrives before peak prevalence is reached in the benchmark. Several features of this case
are worth noting. First, at early stages of the epidemic, social distancing is significantly
higher than in the benchmark. This has the effect of suppressing disease prevalence.
Second, we see that social distancing is gradually phased out entirely, reaching zero on
the date that treatment arrives. The reason for this is that as the arrival of treatment
approaches, the welfare loss from falling ill becomes lower, because there is a higher chance
of making use of the treatment. An individual who becomes infected at time T − ε is not
much worse off than someone who gets infected at time T , because he or she will only
be in the infected state momentarily till the treatment arrives. Third, we note that there
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is a discontinuity in disease prevalence when the treatment arrives. The reason is that
under our assumptions of costless and perfect treatment, once the innovation arrives at
date T , infected individuals all get treated immediately, causing both disease prevalence
and incidence (i.e. cases of new infections) to drop to zero. With imperfect treatment,
these curves would have kinks at date T but not necessarily discontinuities.
Last, the red line shows a case in which the treatment only arrives after peak preva-
lence is reached in the benchmark. In this case, social distancing is also higher than
the benchmark at the early stages (which in turn suppresses disease prevalence), and is
eventually phased out entirely to reach zero on the date of arrival. It should be noted
that the effects of anticipated innovations in treatment depend on the rate of recovery
from infection. The faster people recover from infection, the lower is pre-innovation social
distancing.
Overall, the paths of equilibrium social distancing start at a negligible level. Social
distancing starts intensifying as prevalence picks up. It then peaks, before being phased
out completely by the arrival date of the treatment. It is notable that the earlier the
treatment arrives, the earlier is social distancing exerted and the faster does it peak. As
a natural consequence of this path of social distancing, equilibrium disease prevalence is
on the whole lower than in the no-innovation benchmark.
2.2. The Case of a Perfect Vaccine. Assume that the vaccine is costless, has
no side effects and provides instantaneous and perfect protection against infection in
perpetuity. In this case, a susceptible individual will immediately vaccinate as soon as
the vaccine becomes available and therefore earn flow payoff π from then onward. This
means that the value functions for susceptible and recovered individuals in the post-
vaccine phase are




In contrast, infected individuals cannot benefit from the vaccine and earn π while infected.













This is simply the expected net present value for an individual who is infected and who
will recover at rate γ > 0.
Direct inspection shows that for the case of a vaccine, VI < VS = VR. This is the
reason that decision-makers, whether individuals or the social planner (discussed shortly),
attach an added value to entering the post-vaccine regime while still susceptible.
The equilibrium dynamics for this scenario are illustrated in Figure 2. Again, the
black line shows the benchmark case where vaccine only arrives when the disease has
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Prevalence and Social Distancing When Anticipating Vaccination.
practically died out, at T = 120. The blue line shows the case where the vaccine arrives
before peak prevalence has been reached in the benchmark. We see that in this case, social
distancing is uniformly higher than in the benchmark case till the innovation arrives. In
turn, this causes a suppression of disease prevalence. The same pattern is evident from
the red line, showing a case where the vaccine arrives after the peak. In both cases,
we note that disease prevalence is continuous. Once the vaccine arrives, all remaining
susceptible individuals get costlessly immunized such that there are no new infections.
Any individuals who entered the post-innovation phase as infected slowly recover, causing
disease incidence to become negative. This accounts for the tapering off of prevalence
after the innovation date.
In contrast to the case of treatment, when the vaccine arrives there is a discontinuity
in social distancing. The reason is that as soon as the vaccine arrives, all remaining sus-
ceptible individuals immediately become immunized. As the vaccine and social distancing
are perfect substitutes in avoiding infection but the vaccine is costless, it is optimal to
cease social distancing and instead get immunized. In contrast, an individual who is still
susceptible at time T −ε has a very strong incentive to engage in costly social distancing,
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because remaining susceptible for just a moment longer ensures that the individual can
benefit from perfect and costless protection in the post-vaccine regime.
Last, we note that the earlier the vaccine arrives, the higher is the equilibrium path
of social distancing. This in turn causes a lower path of disease prevalence.
3. Centralized Decision Making
We next consider the first-best path of pre-innovation social distancing. The problem to





e−ρt {S(t)[π − c(d(t))] + I(t)π +R(t)π} dt+e−ρT [S(T )VS+I(T )VI+R(T )VR]
(26)
subject to
Ṡ(t) = −β(1− d(t))I(t)S(t) (27)
İ(t) = I(t) [β(1− d(t))S(t)− γ] (28)
Ṙ(t) = γI(t) (29)
1 = S(t) + I(t) +R(t) (30)
I(0) ≈ 0, I(0) + S(0) = 1, S(0) > γ/β (31)
Note that in contrast to the problem solved by the individuals under decentralized decision
making, the social planner explicitly takes into account that its choice of aggregate social
distancing influences the aggregate dynamics of the disease.
Letting λCi (t) denote the costate variables for the state variables i = S(t), I(t), R(t),
the planner’s current-value Hamiltonian is given by
HC = S(t)[π − c(d(t))] + I(t)π +R(t)π (32)
−λCS (t)(1− d(t))βI(t)S(t) (33)
+λCI (t)[(1− d(t))βI(t)S(t)− γI(t)] (34)
+λCR(t)γI(t) (35)







λCS (t)− λCI (t)
)]
= 0 (36)
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Figure 3: Optimal Prevalence and Social Distancing When Anticipating Treatment.
For quadratic costs, the socially optimal policy is given by
d∗(t) = βI(t)
[
λCS (t)− λCI (t)
]
(37)
The laws of motion for the costate variables are then
λ̇
C






= λCS (t) [ρ+ (1− d(t))βI(t)]− λCI (t)(1− d(t))βI(t)− [π − c(d(t))] (39)
λ̇
C














= ρλCR(t)− π (42)
The transversality conditions are given by the counterparts of (20)-(22) under decentral-
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ized decision making, namely
λCS (T )e
−ρT = VS (43)
λCI (T )e
−ρT = VI (44)
λCR(T )e
−ρT = VR (45)
Before considering the effects of anticipated pharmaceutical interventions, we again con-
sider the no-innovation benchmark. In contrast to individuals’equilibrium behaviour,
the social planner cares about the welfare of the entire population, rather than that of
a single individual. In practice, this means that the planner will want to keep track of
both the evolution of susceptible and infected individuals. Under social planning, it is
also the case that disease prevalence is hump-shaped, as was the case under equilibrium
social distancing. But in addition, the planner is now sensitive to the wellbeing of the
susceptibles, who decrease in measure over time. As in all SIR type models, herd immu-
nity builds up over time, as infected individuals gradually recover and become immune
to further infection.
3.1. The Case of a Perfect Treatment. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of preva-
lence and social distancing chosen by the central planner in anticipation of a treatment.
Relative to the paths under equilibrium behavior, we note a number of differences, some
qualitative and some quantitative. First, under first-best policies, social distancing is
overall more extensive than in equilibrium except at the last stage before the innovation.
This stems from the fact that the social planner factors in the positive externalities of
disease prevention in choosing its optimal policy. This causes disease prevalence to be
lower under the social optimum. Second, while the social planner also phases out social
distancing completely by the innovation date, it implements a significant and relatively
constant level from the outset until the late stages before the treatment arrives. This
causes disease prevalence to be monotone increasing throughout the pre-innovation phase.
On the innovation date, there is a discontinuous jump down to zero. In contrast, in equi-
librium, prevalence can be non-monotone if the innovation date is after the date at which
peak prevalence is reached in the no-innovation benchmark.
3.2. The Case of a Perfect Vaccine. Figure 4 shows disease prevalence and so-
cial distancing chosen by the central planner when anticipating a vaccine. Relative to
the equilibrium paths of social distancing, the socially optimal ones have a few notable
differences, qualitatively as well and quantitatively. First, optimal social distancing is
generally more intensive than the equilibrium level (save for the final stretch before the
innovation date). This is because the planner takes into account all external effects that
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Figure 4: Optimal Prevalence and Social Distancing When Anticipating Vaccination.
flow from the imposed social distancing. In turn, this causes the socially optimal path
of disease prevalence to be significantly lower than its equilibrium counterpart. Second,
while equilibrium social distancing roughly follows the path of disease prevalence, with
very low initial levels and a subsequent gradual increase, the socially optimal path fea-
tures significant social distancing from the outset until the late stages before the arrival
of the vaccine. Note that when a vaccine is anticipated, neither optimal nor equilibrium
social distancing is phased out before the innovation date, as is the case when a treatment
is anticipated. Although the final pre-innovation equilibrium level of social distancing is
higher than that chosen by the social planner at the same date, we cannot conclude that
individuals engage in too much social distancing. The reason is that because individuals
have engaged in less social distancing till that point, disease prevalence is much higher in
equilibrium than it would have been under social planning and therefore the two levels
of social distancing are not directly comparable.
Recall that when anticipating a treatment, both individuals and the planner decrease
social distancing at the end of the pre-innovation phase. In contrast, under the anticipa-
tion of a vaccine, the individuals ramp up social distancing while the planner decreases
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it. This can be explained as follows. Individuals attach a high value to reaching the
post-vaccine phase as susceptibles and therefore ramp up protection till the very last
moment. The planner also attaches a high value to this happening, but has managed
aggregate prevalence throughout the pre-innovation phase. This means that just before
the vaccine arrives, prevalence is relatively modest, allowing it to somewhat decrease
social distancing. The optimal paths of social distancing are not phased out, but end
at a strictly positive level. This is a testament to the value attached by the planner to
increasing the measure of susceptibles that can benefit from the vaccine.
3.3. Aligning Private and Social Incentives. As is often the case in economic
models of infection control, there is a wedge between private and social costs and benefits
of social distancing. The reason is that individuals do not internalize the positive external
effects that flow from their efforts to avoid infection. As shown in Rowthorn and Toxvaerd
(2020), there are incentive schemes that correct for such external effects and implement
the socially optimal outcomes. These can be subsidy/penalty schemes that are attached
either to the protective behavior itself (like furlough schemes, which encourage people
to stay at home rather than to go to work) or to the health status of individuals (like a
reward for remaining uninfected). Often, such schemes are very complicated and must
be modified as the epidemic progresses, which severely limits their practical use. In
contrast, in the present setup there is a scheme that is very simple to implement and
which may provide individuals some incentives to self-protect. Under this scheme, once
the vaccine becomes available, individuals who get vaccinated also receive a reward. As
the health state of an individual is known in our model, only those who have never
been infected by date T will get vaccinated. This means that only at-risk individuals are
eligible. This scheme achieves two separate goals. First, it incentivizes vaccine uptake,
itself an activity that has strong positive externalities (see Chen and Toxvaerd, 2014).
Second, it incentivizes social distancing in the pre-vaccination phase by rewarding those
who make it through to the vaccination phase having never been infected. This scheme is
both easy to communicate and to implement. It should be noted that this is a decidedly
second-best policy and that it is unlikely to be possible to implement the first best through
this scheme. The incentive scheme that implements the first-best outcome modifies the
entire path of the costate variables. In contrast, the proposed second-best scheme only
fixes the value of the costate variables at date T .
4. Discussion
In this paper, we have considered a stylized model of social distancing to analyze the
effects of forthcoming pharmaceutical innovations on pre-innovation social distancing.
We show that decision makers react differently to anticipated treatments and vaccines.
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When anticipating a vaccine, it is important for the decision maker to reach the post-
innovation phase while still susceptible, for otherwise the vaccine has no value. This means
that as the arrival date of the vaccine approaches, the risk-reducing efforts are increased
over time till the individual is effectively immunized. In contrast, when anticipating a
treatment, reaching the post-innovation phase while susceptible is less critical. This is
because someone who is (still) infected by the time that treatment becomes available can
still benefit from treatment, therefore reducing the value of social distancing just before
it becomes available. Thus social distancing is in this case entirely phased out, ceasing
completely by the time the treatment arrives.
Although antiviral treatment will have an important role to play in managing the
epidemic, effective mass vaccination is likely to make the most difference on aggregate.
Our analysis makes an important point and offers a clear policy recommendation. The
anticipated arrival of an effective vaccine should not be taken as a license to loosen restric-
tions and reduce social distancing. In contrast, individuals and public health authorities
should redouble their efforts to reduce the number of new cases to ensure that people
may actually benefit from the protection afforded by an effective vaccine once it arrives.
In the main analysis, we have for simplicity assumed that treatments and vaccinations
were both costless and perfect. This allowed us to express the post-innovation value
functions and thus the transversality conditions entirely in terms of model parameters.
We will briefly discuss how our main insights change when the treatment or vaccine is
imperfect.
In the case of imperfect treatment, there are several effects to consider. Assume that
treatment, rather than inducing instant recovery, only does so with a delay. This is the
formalization used in Toxvaerd and Rowthorn (2020). Since the treatment is costless, it
will be taken up by any infected individual as soon as it becomes available. Thus the post-
innovation value function will be a composite expression that takes into account both the
flow payoff π earned while infected and the flow payoff π earned when recovered, suitably
weighed by the rate at which the individual recovers under treatment. Thus relative to
the case of a perfect treatment, the value function VI is unambiguously lower. Turning to
individuals who reach the post-innovation phase as susceptibles, it’s clear that becoming
infected now involves switching to a health state where the individual earns flow payoff
ρVI rather than π, as is the case when treatment induces instant recovery. This means
that even though an imperfect treatment now becomes available, the individual must
still engage in costly social distancing. For that reason, we have that ρVS < π. In
other words, the value of reaching T as susceptible has now decreased. The value VR
remains unchained. Since two of the transversality conditions change in response to the
imperfections in treatment, it is not possible in general to say what the net effect on
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pre-innovation social distancing is.
In the case of an imperfect vaccine, the effects are simpler to describe. Assume that
once a vaccine is taken, it reduces the infectivity parameter β to σβ where σ ∈ [0, 1] is
the failure probability of the vaccine. This formalization nests two extreme cases. When
σ = 0, we are back in the perfect vaccine case at which no further social distancing
is chosen after date T . When σ = 1, then the vaccine is completely useless and the
innovation date T has no impact on social distancing; the paths of social distancing and
prevalence mirror those of the T → ∞ benchmark. For any intermediate value of the
failure probability σ, the nature of the individual’s problem is the same before and after
the innovation date, but the post-innovation infectivity rate is now reduced because of the
partial protection afforded by the vaccine. But relative to the perfect vaccine case, the
post-innovation value function VS is unambiguously lower as the individual will have to
still engage in costly social distancing after vaccination, while the value functions VI and
VR remain unchanged. This means that the transversality conditions are altered to make
it less valuable to enter the post-innovation phase as a susceptible. This is reflected in a
lower incentive to engage in social distancing ex-ante-innovation.
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